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ABSOLUTE DISMISSAL UNDER FEDERAL RULE 41(a): THE
DISAPPEARING RIGHT OF VOLUNTARY NONSUIT*
AT common law a plaintiff had an absolute right to dismiss his suit without
prejudice at any time before verdict or judgment.' Under strict common law
pleading this rule prevented loss of legitimate claims because of technical
errors.2 Abuse of the right, however, led to highly inequitable results.8 Plain-
tiffs would put defendants to the expense of a lengthy trial, only to dismiss
when an adverse judgment seemed imminent, with the obvious purpose of
trying their chances again with a different judge or jury. Various state
statutes attempted to avoid abuses by restricting absolute dismissal to specific
points in the proceeding, such as before the completion of trial,4 before the
introduction of defendants' evidence,5 or before the actual commencement of
the trial.6
Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure limits absolute dis-
missal to an earlier point than most states. The Rule deals separately with
two situations.7 41 (a) (1) grants the plaintiff an absolute right to dismiss
without prejudice and without an order of the court at any time before ser-
*Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 203 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 964 (1953).
1, Ex parte Skinner & Eddy Corp., 265 U.S. 86 (1924) (judgment); Barrett v.
Virginian Ry., 250 U.S. 473 (1919) (judgment); Confiscation Cases, 7 Wall. 454 (U.S.
1868) (verdict) ; United States v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 118 Fed. 554 (4th Cir. 1902)
(judgment).
2. For a general analysis of the common law background, see Head, The History and
Development of Nonsit, 27 W. VA. L.Q. 20 (1920); McKay, Voluntary Dismissals and
Non-suits in Tennessee, 15 TENN. L. REv. 787 (1939); Notes, 26 TEXAS L. REV. 91
(1947) ; 37 VA. L. REv. 969 (1951).
3. See note 2 supra.
4. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 254 (1940) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 54.09 (1943); IND. ANN.
STAT. §2-901 (Burns, 1946); TEx. R. Civ. P. 164 (Vernon, 1942); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8-220 (1950). Almost three-quarters of the states allow absolute dismissal rights up to
the time of final submission or before the jury retires. See Note, 37 VA. L. REv. 969
(1951).
5. MicH. STAT. ANN. §27.1081. (Henderson, 1938); WASH. REV, CODE § 4.56.120
(1951).
6. CAL. CODE CIV. Paoc. ANN. § 581 (Deering, 1953); CONN. GEN'L STAT. § 7801
(Rev. 1949) ; ILL. REv. STAT. c. 110, § 176 (Smith-Hurd, 1948) ; ORE. REv. STAT. c. 18.230
(1953).
7. "41 (a) (1) By Plaintiff; By Stipulation .... an action may be dismissed by the
plaintiff without order of court (1) by filing a notice of dismissal at any time before
service by the adverse party of an answer or a motion for summary judgment, whichever
first occurs, or (11) by filing stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have
appeared in the action....
"41 (a) (2) By order of Court. Except as provided by paragraph (1) of this sub-
division of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon
order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper..."
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vice of an answer or motion for summary judgment;8 41(a) (2) provides
that after such service the court, in its discretion, may refuse to allow dis-
missal without prejudice or may permit withdrawal on "terms and condi-
tions."9 Such "terms and conditions" usually include reimbursement of de-
fendant's expenditures, including attorney's fees. 10 But, despite the Rule's
clear line between unconditional and conditional dismissal, defendants have
argued that arbitrary dismissal is sometimes barred even before filing of an
answer.
11
In the recent Second Circuit decision of Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Cyanamid Co.,'2 defendant succeeded in narrowing a plaintiff's right to
dismissal under 41(a) (1). In a suit for specific performance of an alleged
contract for sale of a factory, plaintiff filed a complaint and at the same time
moved for a preliminary injunction pendentc lite to restrain defendant from
selling the assets in question to a third party. After a lengthy hearing the
district court denied the injunction.13 Thereafter, no answer having been
served, plaintiff dismissed under 41(a) (1). Plaintiff seemingly feared that
the New York Statute of Frauds barred the action and planned to sue again
in British Guiana.' 4 Defendant moved to vacate the notice of dismissal but
the lower court held that until an answer or motion for summary judgment
had been filed plaintiff's right was absolute. 15 The appellate court reversed
this order. It noted that the hearing had consumed four days and 420 pages
of record at great expense to defendant, that the merits of the controversy
had been squarely raised, and that the trial judge had decided plaintiff's
chances of success were "very remote if not completely nil."'( Reasoning
that literal compliance here with Rule 41 (a) (1) would conflict with the Rule's
purpose of limiting unconditional dismissal to an early stage in the proceed-
ings, the court of appeals denied absolute dismissal and remanded to the dis-
8. See generally, 5 Moo1n, FEDRAT. PRaCTICE 1001, (2d ed. 1951); 7 CvcaopzrA op
FEDERAL PROCEDURE 366 (2d ed. 1943).
9. Grivas v. Parmelee Transportation Co., 207 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1953) ; International
Shoe Co. v. Cool, 154 F.2d 778 (8th Cir.), cert. den ied, 329 U.S. 726 (1946); Evans v.
Teche Lines, Inc., 112 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1940).
10. New York, C. & St. L.R.R. v. Vardaman, 181 F.2d 769 (8th Cir. 1950); Federal
Savings & Loan Ins. C~rp. v. Reeves, 148 F.2d 731 (8th Cir. 1945); Welter v. E. I. Du
Pont De Nemours & Co., 1 F.R.D. 551 (D. Minn. 1941); McCann v. Bentley Stores
Corp., 34 F. Supp. 234 (W.D. Mo. 1940). 41(a)(1) makes no provision for the im-
position of any "terms or conditions." White v. Thompson, Z0 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. Ill.
1948).
11. See note 20 infra.
12. 203 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 964 (1953).
13. Transcript of Record, p. 116, Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.,
203 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1953).
14. Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 15 F.R.D. 14, 17 (S.D.N.Y.
(1953).
15. Transcript of Record, p. 5, Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.,
203 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1953).
16. 203 F.2d 105, 107-108 (2d Cir. 1953).
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trict court to decide if dismissal under 41(a) (2) should be allowed.17 On
remand, the trial court denied dismissal after a detailed weighing of the
equities.1 s
Harvey's narrowing of plaintiff's absolute dismissal rights is in direct con-
flict with the clear language and history of 41(a) (1).19 Previously, defen-
dants argued for a broad definition of the term "answer" as used in the Rule
to include various defense motions. However, on the theory that the Rule
should be strictly construed because in derogation of a common law right,
courts have consistently refused to stretch the concept of answer beyond its
commonly accepted interpretation." And the Second Circuit itself was ap-
parently committed to a literal reading of 41(a) (1).21
However, Harvey's reading of the Rule finds some support in two earlier
cases.? In both instances the courts held that since pre-answer pleadings
raised the merits of the controversy, the equivalent of an answer had been
17. Ibid.
18. Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 15 F.R.D. 14 (S.D.N.Y.
1953). The court stated that denial of a motion for preliminary injunction has no effect
on a trial on the merits, and that, since proceedings had progressed to an advanced stage
here and defendant had already expended $84,000, a new suit in British Guiana would
be burdensome.
19. See note 20 infra.
20. "The employment of the term 'answer' in Rule 41(a) (1) cannot be assigned to
inadvertence or to unconsidered selection of the word. It signifies an answer as that ex-
pression is used in the rules, and, thus used, it does not include a motion . . . Rule
41(a) (1) somewhat narrowed the right as formerly exercised. It ought not still further
be narrowed by unindicated judicial construction and application." Wilson & Co. v. Fre-
mont Cake and Meal Co., 83 F. Supp. 900, 904 (D. Neb. 1949).
Courts allowed absolute dismissal in the following situations: Penn. R.R. v. Daoust
Const. Co., 193 F.2d 659 (7th Cir. 1952) (after motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted) ; Robertshaw-Fulton Controls Co. v. Noma Elec.
Corp., 10 F.R.D. 32 (D. Md. 1950) (after motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction) ;
Wilson & Co. v. Fremont Cake and Meal Co., 83 F. Supp. 900 (D. Neb. 1949) (after
stay pending arbitration) ; White v. Thompson, 80 F. Supp. 411 (N.D. 11. 1948) (after
motion to transfer to another jurisdiction) ; Compania Plomari De Vapores v. American
Hellenic Corp., 8 F.R.D. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (after "appearance"); Flaig v. Yellow
Cab Co., 4 F.R.D. 174 (W.D. Mo. 1944) (after removal).
21. Kilpatrick v. Texas & P. Ry., 72 F. Supp. 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1947), rezed, 166 F.2d
788 (2d Cir. 1948). Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
and for improper service. After a lengthy hearing, but before decision, plaintiff moved to
dismiss under 41(a) (1). The lower court held that since, under Rule 12, defendant's
objection could have been made either by answer or by motion before answer, the court
would consider that the motions were equivalent to answers and deny dismissal. The
Second Circuit reversed, stating that a motion under Rule 12(b) was a "defense" and
could not conceivably be called an "answer." Since Rule 12(b) includes seven different
motions, there seemed to be little else the defendant could file that would be compared
to an answer.
22. Butler v. Denton, 150 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1945); Love v. Silas Mason, 66 F.
Supp. 753 (W.D. La. 1946).
In Butler plaintiff filed notice of dismissal after the United States had filed a plea of
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filed.a But Harvey goes even further than these cases. Here, the defendant
had filed no pleadings at all and the court examined a preliminary hearing
to determine if the merits were raised. Furthermore, the decision relied on
not only the raising of the merits, but on other factors such as pre-trial ex-
pense to defendant and the plaintiff's chances of ultimate success in the liti-
gation.
Harvey's pessimistic evaluation of plaintiff's chances of winning the lawsuit
seems unnecessary to the decision. That determination is crucial in Rule
41 (a) (2) cases. "4 Under this Rule, when plaintiff's chances of winning appear
slight, courts will deny any voluntary nonsuit on the theory that defendant
has acquired "substantial rights."2 1; But when the issue is whether or not to
apply 41(a) (2), factors which would bar dismissal completely should be
irrelevant If the Second Circuit took the prophecy of plaintiff's chances
seriously, it would have denied dismissal at once instead of remanding for
independent decision by the trial court. 0G
If, on the other hand, the raising of the merits is essential to Harvey's
result, the case can be restricted to motions for preliminary injunctions or for
dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.- Only
these motions are likely to entail discussion of the basic legal issues in the
case. However, defendants may well argue for a broad interpretation of
"merits" to include any defense motions which would bar the action.29
intervention. The court denied dismissal on the grounds that the plea of intervention had
tendered justiciable issues.
The Love case arose before the 1946 amendment to 41 (a) (1) which added the motion
for summary judgment. Nevertheless the court denied dismissal after defendant filed a
plea in prescription alleging the statute of limitations and a motion for summary judg-
ment.
23. See note 22 mgpra.
24. Evans v. Teche Lines Inc., 112 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1940) (court had announced
intention of directing verdict for defendant); Bowles v. South Pittsburg Coal Co., 7
F.R.D. 139 (E.D. Tenn. 1945) (rule denying motion for preliminary injunction would bar
the action on the merits) ; Colonial Oil Co. v. American Oil Co., 3 F.R.D. 29 (E.D.S.C.
1943) (after plaintiff's verdict reversed on appeal) ; Roth v. Great Atlantic and Pacific
Tea Co., 2 F.R.D. 182 (S.D. Ohio 1942) (defendant entitled to a verdict).
25. See note 24 sapra.
26. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 provides: "The Supreme Court or any other court of appellant
jurisdiction may ... modify or . . . reverse any judgment, decree or order of a court
... and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment. ...
See, e.g., Red Warrior Coal & Mining Co. v. Boron, 194 F.2d 578 (3d Cir. 1952) ; In-
ternational Shoe Co. v. Cool, 154 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1946).
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 65 (preliminary injunction); FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (failure to
state claim).
28. Acceptance of such an argument would in effect overrule Wilson & Co. v. Fre-
mont Cake & Meal Co., 83 F. Supp. 900 (D. Neb. 1949) (stay pending arbitration), and
Kilpatrick v. Te-xas & P. Ry., 166 F2d 788 (2d Cir. 1948) (lack of jurisdiction), and
reopen the questions decided in the cases in note 20 supra. At the very least, a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, accompanied by affidavits, should be treated as a
motion for summary judgment within 41(a) (1). 5 MOORE, FDnMaL. PnAcrlao 1013 (2d
ed. 1951).
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However, the emphasis the Second Circuit placed on the cost factor indi-
cates that substantial outlays by defendant may alone be enough to bring a
case within the scope of 41 (a) (2). The courts stressed that the drafters of
41(a) (1) intended to forbid absolute dismissal when the defendant had in-
curred significant expenses in preparing his case. 29 It seems likely that
preparation for any hearing or motion which costs the defendant more than
a nominal sum would call for application for 41(a) (2). Perhaps even the
expense of interrogatories or discovery procedures would be sufficient. 0 Then,
unless the equities weigh so heavily against the plaintiff as to bar dismissal
completely, dismissal would be granted on condition that defendant's expenses
be paid.31
The Harvey decision obviously produces a major change in existing law,
but it is in line with the desirable trend away from plaintiff's common law
right of unrestricted dismissal.32 However, the conflict between 41(a) and
the Harvey decision will doubtless cause confusion. The Advisory Committee
on the Federal Rules should meet the problem by redrafting 41 (a). In view
of the Federal Rules' liberal policy towards continuances 3 and amendments
of pleading,34 the primary reasons for any absolute right to dismiss have dis-
appeared. Thus, the plaintiff has remedies other than voluntary nonsuit if
he is surprised by new evidence or if he errs in the pleadings. 5 In line with
Harvey's emphasis on the cost factor, any change in the Rule should be
directed towards protecting the defendant from wasted expenditure. The
preparation and filing of any motion involves considerable expense.30 Similar-
29. Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 203 F.2d 105, 107 (2d Cir.
1953). The Committee Note reads: "A motion for summary judgment may be forth-
coming prior to answer, and if well taken will eliminate the necessity for an answer.
Since such a motion may require even more research and preparation than the answer
itself, there is good reason why the service of the motion, like that of the answer, should
prevent a voluntary dismissal without court approval." ADvIsORY CoMMIrEE's NOTE To
FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (a) (1), 5 MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcrIcE 1005 (2d ed. 1951).
30. Pre-trial preparation often involves great expense. Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v.
American Cyanamid Co., 15 F.R.D. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) ($84,000); Federal Savings &
Loan Ins. Corp. v. First National Bank 4 F.R.D. 313 (W.D. Mo. 1945) ($6,700); Der-
man v. Stor-Aid, Inc., 7 F.R.Serv. 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) ($5,000); Cincinnati Traction
Bldg. Co. v. Pullman-Standard Car Mfg. Co., 25 F. Supp. 322 (D. Del. 1938) ($12,000).
31, See notes 10 and 24 supra.
32. For general discussion see commentators cited in note 2 supra.
33. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b) and FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f) govern continuances in specific
situations and FED R. Civ. P. 83 grants district courts the right to regulate their own
practices in regard to other situations. See 7 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PRocEDunE 352
(2d ed. 1943).
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 15.
35. Plaintiffs may also want to dismiss because they discover, subsequent to their
complaint, that more favorable law exists elsewhere. Courts split on whether 41(a) (2)
dismissal should be allowed in this situation. Dismissal was allowed in Klar v. Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., 14 F.R.D. 176 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (statute of limitations), but denied
in Love v. Silas Mason, 66 F. Supp. 753 (W.D. La. 1946) (statute of limitations).
36. See note 30 supra.
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ly, where the plaintiff files a motion requesting affirmative relief, such as a
preliminary injunction, the defendant must still prepare for a hearing, though
he need file no particular pleading. In response to these considerations, the
Rule could be amended to deny absolute dismissal at any time after defendant
filed a motion or after plaintiff petitioned the court for affirmative relief.
However, an even further-reaching amendment seems desirable. The actual
court cost of filing a motion is nominal compared to the expense of research
involved in preparing the motion. But, the latter expense might well go un-
compensated, since plaintiff would be free to dismiss just before defendant
actually filed the motion. Furthermore, the above solution would retain the
difficult problems of the borderline case, inherent in drafting any arbitrary
cut-off point. A better result can be obtained by complete abolition of
41 (a) (1), placing dismissal in the discretion of the court from the time the
complaint is filed.3 7 41(a) (2) decisions will then become precedent, and
courts could balance the equities in each case to adequately protect both
parties.
37. Rule 41(a), as amended, would read as follows: "An action shall not be dis-
missed at the plaintiff's instance save by filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all
parties who have appeared in the action, or upon order of the court and upon such terms
and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defen-
dant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiff's motion to dismiss, the action shall not
be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the counterclaim can remain pend-
ing for independent adjudication by the court. Unless 6therwise specified in the order,
a dismissal under this paragraph is without prejudice."
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